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Analogical Reasoning, Cognition, and the Response to Technological Change: 




We examine how analogical reasoning affects cognition and investment decisions in the face of 
technological change. Our research design is an in-depth, longitudinal case study of Nokia and 
its response to mobile Internet between the late 1990s and the mid-2010s. We show that Nokia 
diligently analyzed the competitive dynamics of other industries, such as the personal computer 
industry, that had already been affected by the same technological discontinuities and used such 
lessons from these industries to anticipate future competition outcomes in the mobile phone 
business. We also show that analogical reasoning helped Nokia’s managers change the beliefs 
developed through their prior experiences. However, Nokia’s managers became overconfident in 
their new beliefs, and this overconfidence constrained their cognitive processes of attention and 
interpretation, thereby increasing organizational inertia. This constraint was particularly evident 
in the new belief that the software operating system was the essential source of product 
differentiation. This belief directed key investment decisions for over a decade and contributed to 
the eventual decline of Nokia by leading the company to embrace Microsoft’s Windows Phone 
rather than Google’s Android. 
 





Cognitive representations are a critical determinant of managerial choices and actions (Barr, 
1998; Fiol, 1990; Nightingale, 1998). The long-term performance of firms in the face of 
technological discontinuities, in particular, is often the result of managers’ representations of 
such discontinuities (Nadkarni and Barr, 2008; Walsh, 1995).  
The extant research on cognition primarily focuses on the relationship between managerial 
beliefs and strategic outcomes (Eggers and Kaplan, 2013; Kaplan, 2008b; Tripsas and Gavetti, 
2000). This research shows that senior managers often struggle to evolve their mental frames in 
rapidly changing environments and that this struggle leads to organizational inertia (Garud and 
Rappa, 1994; Kiesler and Sproull, 1982; Thrane et al., 2010).  
While most scholars have focused on the impact of managerial beliefs on strategic 
outcomes, other scholars have explored the cognitive dynamics that occur in organizations. This 
work has shown that strategic beliefs are not static and that decision-making processes can 
deeply affect the evolution of managers’ mental models (Garud et al., 2010; Laamanen and 
Wallin, 2009; Szulanski et al., 2004). In particular, some scholars have focused on the role of 
analogical reasoning in informing managerial beliefs (Gary et al., 2012; Gavetti et al., 2005). In 
this paper, we expand this latter work by examining the relationship between analogical 
reasoning and managerial cognition in the midst of technological discontinuities and the effects 
of this relationship on investment decisions.  
Our research design is an in-depth, longitudinal case study of Nokia and the mobile phone 
industry between the late 1990s and mid-2010s, when the Finnish company had to cope with the 
advent of new 3G wireless communication technologies (i.e., the mobile Internet) and the 




mobile communication. To sustain its leadership, Nokia relied on formal, systematic approaches 
to strategic decision-making and extensively used analogical reasoning. Top executives 
diligently analyzed the competitive dynamics of other industries—such as the personal computer 
(PC) industry—that had already been affected by the same technological discontinuities and used 
the lessons that they gained from these industries to anticipate future competition outcomes in 
the mobile phone business.  
Our findings show that analogical reasoning strongly contributed to changing the beliefs 
Nokia’s managers developed through the prior experiences of their company and industry. This 
was the case, in particular, for the new belief that the company could not differentiate its 3G 
handsets without differentiating the software operating system. Remarkably, under the previous 
2G technological paradigm, mobile handsets had not run any operating systems, and Nokia had 
historically based its success on other sources of differentiation, such as product design, brand 
recognition, hardware performance, array of models, and time to market.  
The new belief about the essential role of the software operating system originated from 
the analogy of the rise of Microsoft and the decline of hardware manufacturers in the PC 
industry. This managerial belief directed key investment decisions for more than a decade: it led 
Nokia first to develop Symbian in the early 2000s and then to embrace Microsoft’s Windows 
Phone (rather than Google’s Android) in the early 2010s. 
Overall, our work shows that although analogical reasoning helps managers to evolve their 
beliefs, the new beliefs themselves that analogical reasoning informs might become firmly held 
and constrain search processes in a turbulent environment. Managers might become 
overconfident in their new beliefs, and overconfidence (i.e., excessive certainty about one’s 




The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it expands our understanding of the 
cognitive dynamics behind the origin and evolution of managerial beliefs (Kaplan and Tripsas, 
2008; Kaplan, 2008b). Second, this paper addresses the debate regarding the role of analogical 
reasoning and, more generally, strategy making in technology management (Farmer and Lafond, 
2016; Gavetti and Menon, 2016; Hekkert et al., 2007).  
 
2. Analogical reasoning, cognition, and technological change 
2.1. Managerial cognition and competition outcomes 
Cognition has long been a mainstream research field in management, as it emphasizes the 
role of managerial beliefs (i.e., mental models and strategic assumptions) in directing search 
processes in a changing environment, the evolution of organizational resources, and ultimately, 
competition outcomes (Laamanen et al., 2018; Nadkarni and Narayanan, 2007; Walsh 1995). 
The pioneering work of Kiesler and Sproull (1982) characterized managerial cognition as the 
process of noticing stimuli from the external environment, interpreting them, and integrating 
their meaning with other relevant information to make strategic decisions. Subsequent studies 
focused on two cognitive processes that are relevant to strategic decision-making, namely, 
attention and interpretation.  
Regarding attention, Ocasio (1997, p. 202) argued that “the ability of the firm to adapt 
successfully to a changing environment is conditional on whether the firm’s procedural and 
communication channels focus the attention of the organizational decision makers on an 
appropriate set of issues and answers”. Empirical research has shown that managerial attention 




(Nadkarni and Barr, 2008), the timing of entry into a new product market (Eggers and Kaplan, 
2009), the development of explorative and exploitative capabilities (Koryak et al., 2018), and the 
detection of weak signals that lead to a crisis (Rerup, 2009). 
Concerning the cognitive process of interpretation, Daft and Weick (1984), Jackson and 
Dutton (1988), and Porac et al. (1995) explored how managers make sense of the abundant and 
unstructured information that they receive from a changing environment. Kaplan (2008b), 
Thomas et al. (1993), and Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) connected managerial interpretation to the 
strategic actions of organizations, as empirically observed, in relation to environmental 
discontinuities such as new technologies and customer needs.  
The mainstream research on cognition has traditionally focused on the content issues of 
strategic beliefs (i.e., what managers believe) and their impact on competition outcomes. For 
instance, in the transition from analog to digital imaging, a firmly held managerial belief in a 
razor/blade business model significantly delayed Polaroid’s commercialization of a stand-alone 
digital camera and ultimately jeopardized the capability of the company to adapt to its changing 
industry (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). Similar effects have been found in the shift from print to 
online newspapers (Gilbert, 2006), in pharmaceutical firms’ responses to the emergence of 
biotechnology (Kaplan et al., 2003), and in communication technology firms’ responses to fiber 
optics (Kaplan, 2008b).  
These studies all generally emphasize that mental frames are a static representation of the 
business environment resulting from the prior history of managers and their companies (Kaplan 
and Tripsas, 2008). Specifically, according to Kaplan (2008b, p. 738), managerial beliefs depend 
on “previous experiences—including individual career histories, project experience, functional 




prevailing technological paradigm”. As they work together, over time, senior managers create a 
shared understanding of their external environment, i.e., a “dominant logic” that ultimately 
drives collective decisions and actions (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). For instance, in the case of 
Polaroid, the belief of managers in the razor/blade business model was because of their previous 
experiences with the technology of analog imaging (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000).  
In changing industries, the difficulty of managers to adapt their static and history-based 
beliefs often constrains the scope of their search processes, which leads to organizational inertia 
and poor performance (Nadkarni and Barr, 2008). A crucial challenge is thus the ability to assess 
the accuracy of the beliefs inherited from previous experiences by distinguishing the beliefs that 
still correctly represent the evolving competitive landscape from the beliefs that instead represent 
“blind spots” (Kaplan, 2011; Walsh, 1995). 
 
2.2. Analogy and cognitive dynamics 
While most scholars have emphasized the content issues of managerial beliefs and the 
relationship between such content issues and strategic outcomes, as described above, other 
scholars have focused on the cognitive dynamics occurring in organizations. Instead of a static 
representation of cognition in which managers are depicted as constrained by rigid mental 
models, these scholars have portrayed cognition as a dynamic process that is influenced by and, 
in turn, influences the activities and patterns of strategic decision-making (Kaplan, 2008b; 
Laamanen and Wallin, 2009; Szulanski et al., 2004).  
In particular, some scholars have emphasized the relevance of analogical reasoning in 
shaping the evolution of mental models in a novel situation (Gavetti et al., 2005; Gilboa and 




through a perceived similarity between this current problem and another problem encountered in 
the past. Specifically, analogical reasoning involves using a familiar, prior situation (which is 
called the “source analog” or the “source problem”) to make inferences and inform assumptions 
about a new situation (the so-called “target problem”). The transfer of insights from the source 
problem to the target problem might take the form of a suggested solution or a warning of a 
threat (Gary et al., 2012). 
The application of analogies from a past problem to a novel situation can reduce 
complexity and uncertainty and enable managers to adapt their beliefs to a dynamic environment. 
However, several factors affect the benefits that decision makers can concretely achieve through 
analogical reasoning (Gavetti and Menon, 2016). First, the effectiveness of analogies depends on 
how managers identify the main features and characteristics of the target problem. Second, it 
depends on how managers search their library experiences in their memory to retrieve a prior 
situation (source problems) that has similar features to the target problem. Third, the 
effectiveness of analogies depends on the extent to which the solution inferred from the source 
problem gets adapted to reflect the peculiarities of the target problem.  
In this regard, Gentner (1983) made a clear distinction between analogies premised on 
superficial features (i.e., features that characterize the source and target problems but that are not 
part of what makes a particular solution work) and analogies premised on relevant features or 
“structural relations”. Structural relations are the underlying principles for why a given solution 
works well—or poorly—in the source and the target problems: they are the higher order 
relationships governing the way something works, such as causal or functional relations. The key 




relations of the target problem (Gavetti et al., 2005). Without such structural alignment, 
managers are unlikely to find valuable solutions to external changes and novel situations.             
 
2.3. Analogy, cognition, and technological change   
Despite the growing interest of scholars, our knowledge regarding the relationship between 
analogical reasoning and cognition in the face of major technological discontinuities is relatively 
limited. In particular, a relevant issue that has remained unexplored is the impact of beliefs that 
stem from analogical reasoning on investment decisions regarding new technologies, products, 
and markets.  
Previous work concerning strategy making and cognitive dynamics generally claims that 
managers tend to be overconfident in their emerging assumptions about the future and optimistic 
about the success of investments in new products and markets based on these assumptions, while 
this overconfidence often leads to poor organizational performance (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; 
Simon and Houghton, 2003). Overconfidence implies that an individual’s certainty that her or his 
assumptions are correct exceeds the accuracy of these assumptions; overconfidence is more 
likely to arise when managers make assumptions regarding less repetitive decisions (e.g., new 
product introductions or pioneering of new markets), face difficult tasks, and, more generally, 
when the environment is complex and uncertain (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; Klayman et al., 
1999). However, thus far, no studies specifically addressed the case of business managers using 
analogical reasoning to cope with technological change or explored the (over)confidence of these 
managers in their emerging assumptions regarding new technologies, products and markets.   
This lack of empirical research reveals a major gap in the extant literature and a major 




competition outcomes. In this paper, we seek to seize this opportunity. We extend current theory 
and create new insights by exploring how analogical reasoning affects cognition and investment 
decisions in the face of technological discontinuities. 
Given the critical influence of top executives on strategic investments and according to the 
previous work of mainstream scholars in the field of cognition, we focus on the beliefs of the 
senior management team (Barr et al., 1992; Nadkarni and Barr, 2008; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). 
Our central contribution concerns cognitive dynamics in corporate organizations, specifically the 
origin and evolution of managerial beliefs (Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008). We find that by 
expanding the analytical efforts of managers beyond the scope of their firms and industries, 
analogical reasoning can enrich their cognitive maps. Managers are likely to develop new beliefs 
that represent strong discontinuities from their idiosyncratic experiences. However, we also 
found that managers might become overconfident in the new beliefs that originate from 
analogical reasoning and that these beliefs can increase inertia rather than adaptation. We 
therefore add to our understanding of the advantages and limitations of technological forecasting 
and anticipatory approaches to innovation management (Hoisl et al., 2015; Nightingale, 2004). 
 
3. Data and methods 
Given the gap in the literature and the open-ended nature of our question, we adopted the case 
study methodology (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994). We used a single-case and 
longitudinal research design because it allows one to richly describe the existence of a 
phenomenon and the conditions under which this phenomenon might occur (Eisenhardt and 




managerial beliefs and their role in strategic responses to environmental change (Tripsas and 
Gavetti, 2000). 
 
3.1. Case selection 
The research setting is a major multinational company in a highly dynamic industry. 
Specifically, we studied the co-evolution of analogical reasoning, managerial beliefs and 
investment decisions at Nokia after the advent of the 3G wireless communication standard (i.e., 
the mobile Internet) and the convergence of digital functions (e.g., games, imaging, music, radio 
and television broadcasting) into mobile communication beginning in the late 1990s. Faced with 
these technological discontinuities, Nokia engaged in extensive analytical efforts and analogical 
reasoning to support its long-term leadership. These efforts explicitly aimed to challenge the 
established mental models of decision makers. Although the company initially succeeded in 
sustaining its leadership, eventually, it declined dramatically. Thus, the case of Nokia represents 
a compelling setting to investigate our research question regarding the relationship among 
analogical reasoning, cognition, and long-term performance. 
 
3.2. Data collection 
The focal period of interest for our longitudinal study is from 1998 to 2016. The study period 
starts in 1998, when Nokia became the global leader among 2G handset makers and the first 
precommercial 3G network was launched, and ends in 2016, when Nokia’s mobile phone 
business division was finally dismantled by Microsoft—after Microsoft itself had acquired it in 




decision-making processes; ii) managerial beliefs; iii) investment decisions; and iv) performance 
(market share, sales and profits).  
Our research question shaped our data collection plan and process. This process was 
iterative, stopping when a level of saturation was reached (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), and relied 
on two primary data sources: archives and interviews. We first gathered extensive archival data 
from both internal and external sources. Internal sources included press releases, annual reports 
and business reviews, internal reports and presentations, organizational charts, and video and 
audio archives of presentations made by the firm’s executives at public conferences and 
meetings or at product launch events. External sources included prior studies of Nokia’s history 
and business press articles about both Nokia and its main competitors selected via 
ABI/INFORM, complemented with analyst reports (Aspara et al., 2013; Doz and Kosonen, 
2008). External sources also included high-tech magazines and specialized websites that covered 
the evolution of the mobile communication industry throughout the 2000s and 2010s. Finally, 
leading research and consulting firms such as Gartner and International Data Corporation (IDC) 
provided extensive data about the worldwide sales and market shares of Nokia and its rivals. 
Overall, the archival data included more than 18,000 pages of documentation and 60 videos.  
Our second main data source was interviews with internal and external informants. The 
interviews were semi-structured, as they were open-ended but based on a common set of 
questions about strategic decision-making processes and managerial assumptions regarding the 
future evolution of the mobile communication business. The internal informants were business 
executives who were selected according to their tenure and involvement in the strategic decision-
making processes of the firm. In particular, we interviewed the senior managers in charge of 




corporate planners, R&D and product innovation managers, and executive directors. The external 
informants were business partners, industry experts, and consultants selected according to their 
direct involvement with and knowledge of the company. The use of multiple internal and 
external informants mitigates the potential biases of any individual respondent, while the 
combination of archival sources and interviews enables a rich, triangulated and relatively 
accurate exploration of the phenomena under study (Kumar et al.,1993).  
In total, we conducted 34 interviews. The interviews generally lasted from one to two 
hours and were conducted between 2002 and 2011. 
 
3.3. Data analysis 
The data analysis used the traditional approaches for case study research (Bettis et al., 2015; 
Eisenhardt et al., 2016; Locke, 2001; Yin, 2003). The data analysis and data collection proceeded 
in a highly iterative way as new data were used to test the robustness of our emerging 
interpretations of the relationship between analogical reasoning and cognition. 
Our research question (How does analogical reasoning affect cognition and investment 
decisions in the face of technological discontinuities?) guided the prioritization of the analytical 
process. During the early stage, we carefully examined our informants’ data and aimed to 
produce a rich description of their decision-making processes, emerging managerial beliefs, and 
strategic investments. According to the prescriptions for grounded-theory building, the data were 
content analyzed to search for emerging codes and categories (Charmaz, 2006; Locke, 2001; 
Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The codes and categories were labeled in terms that were close to the 
words that were actually used by Nokia’s executives, especially our informants, when expressing 




relationship with analogical reasoning processes resulted from our data in the form of forward-
looking statements introduced by words and phrases, such as “according to our WorldMap”, 
“according to our roadmaps” (we illustrate both Nokia’s roadmaps and WorldMap in the 
following section), “our future business will be”, “we believe”, “we foresee”, and “we assume”. 
The coding process was highly iterative. In the first round of data analysis, codes were 
used to emphasize basic beliefs about future changes in technologies, markets and competitors, 
products and product features. Subsequent rounds of data analysis helped us to categorize the 
basic codes and group them in macro codes to illustrate the beliefs of Nokia’s managers about 
future sources of success in the mobile communication business and the barriers to these sources. 
These beliefs are described in the next sections of the paper and summarized in Fig. 1. The 
coding process evolved through constant comparison and occurred on two levels, namely, within 
each interview and official document, which helped identify emerging beliefs, and across 
interviews and official documents, which helped identify the recurrence and strength of these 
beliefs. 
Following past research on cognition and strategic decision-making (e.g., Camerer and 
Lovallo, 1999: Laamanen and Wallin, 2009; Simon and Houghton, 2003), we checked the 
consistency between managerial assumptions and investment decisions in new technological 
skills, marketing and production resources, products and product features. We also tracked the 
timing of these decisions and compared them with the timing of the decisions of other mobile 
phone manufacturers. Furthermore, following past research on strategy making and cognition 
(e.g., de Geus, 1988; Phadnis et al., 2015), we contrasted the emerging assumptions of Nokia’s 
managers with their previous individual and organizational experiences. We thus checked 




represented a discontinuity instead. These different levels of investigation helped us to assess the 
confidence of Nokia’s managers in their emerging assumptions about the future and the ultimate 
role of these assumptions in directing their investment decisions.   
In each step of collecting and analyzing the data, we used tables and memos to summarize 
our main findings and early interpretations and to track and develop our emerging insights. We 
then followed an iterative process of cycling among the data, emerging theory, and literature to 
refine our central constructs and theoretical propositions, relate them to existing theories, and 
clarify our contributions. 
 
4. Technological change and analogical reasoning at Nokia 
Beginning in the late 1990s, Nokia established a systematic approach to investigating 
technological and market changes, anticipating their likely evolution and impact, and integrating 
forecasts into operations. Strategic decision-making efforts were coordinated by a corporate 
planning unit, involved a wide network of partners, suppliers, customers, and consultants, and 
extensively used analogical reasoning.  
The main aim of these efforts was to change the established mental models of top 
executives by providing fresh new insights and knowledge that extended beyond the 
idiosyncratic history of Nokia and the mobile phone industry. A specific team was tasked with 
diligently investigating all different sectors within the broadly defined Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) business, especially those sectors that had already 
experienced the advent of the Internet and digital technologies, i.e., the PC, imaging, game, and 
music industries. Then, Nokia’s executives used these different industries as source problems for 




their mobile communication industry (target problem). A senior manager explained to us as 
follows: 
One of the main output of our foresight approach is the Nokia WorldMap, which we 
deliver on a yearly basis. The Nokia WorldMap compiles those trends and disruptions in 
the Converging Digital Industry and related macro environment that are of highest 
potential impact to Nokia in the next five years.1  
 
We seek to combine business, technology, and user perspectives to provide trend and 
disruption input to the strategy process; challenge widely held orthodoxies in Nokia; raise 
cross-functional awareness of important trends and disruptions across the company; 
stimulate out-of-the-box thinking and strategic dialogue; and identify new business 
opportunities. 
 
We collect market data and rely on external sources like business experts, consultants, and 
academics to bring unique insight and foresight on topics that drive the renewal of Nokia. 
We learn from the impact of disruptive technologies on different market areas and 
organizations within the broadly defined ICT business, like hardware manufacturers in the 
PC industry and the imaging industry.  
 
Our target audience are Nokia’s top decision makers, planners and participants in Nokia 
strategy work, roadmappers and other future-oriented employees. We involve top 
managers in the future exploration process itself to understand the underlying drivers and 
implications needed for decision making. Changes in mental models can only be achieved 
via a process of cocreation [emphasis added]. 
 
The key findings of the investigation of the broad ICT industry were summarized in the 
Nokia WorldMap, which is a document listing the most relevant drivers of change in 
technologies, customer needs, and competitive dynamics able to affect Nokia and the mobile 
phone business. The Nokia WorldMap was regularly updated and further elaborated through 
product and technology roadmaps, which helped Nokia’s managers make their emerging 
assumptions about the future explicit and share these assumptions across the company.2  
                                                 
1 The concept of disruptive innovation was originally introduced by Christensen (1997). 
2 Product and technology roadmaps are graphical representations of interconnected nodes of the co-evolution 




The roadmaps consisted of different layers; at the top level, the roadmaps were primarily 
graphic and included hypotheses regarding future product features, market segments, suppliers 
and competitors. Below the top level, roadmaps involved more detailed analyses and documents, 
typically a spreadsheet that further explored future market segments, competitors, and product 
features. The deepest level of the roadmaps consisted of text documents describing the future 
industry value chain, competitors, technology trends, and resources (e.g., marketing and 
manufacturing assets) required for sustaining the leadership of the company. Remarkably, the 
model number of each device that Nokia made throughout the 2000s was designated around an 
entire scheme that fit into its overall product roadmap. As a senior manager illustrated,  
Roadmapping is Nokia’s plan. It’s a living document. Our roadmaps are our future and 
how we define it. 
 
5. Beliefs and investment decisions 
The diligent scanning of the PC, imaging, game, and music businesses and the use of these 
industries as source problems for analogical reasoning informed some new beliefs, which indeed 
disrupted the established mental models (“widely held orthodoxies”) of Nokia’s managers. These 
new beliefs regarded i) the crucial role of the software operating system in the differentiation of 
future 3G handsets and ii) the decline of traditional voice- and text-based phones and the rise of 
completely new product categories.  
These beliefs had a profound impact on the investments that Nokia made beginning in the 
late 1990s in relation to technological skills, production and marketing assets, and products. We 
frame the description of these investment decisions around three main periods that marked the 
evolution of the competitive position of the company: 1) from the 1998 to 2003, when the 




Nokia withdrew its early product categories and launched its new smartphone products; and 3) 
from 2009 to 2014, when Google and Apple entered the smartphone business and finally 
prompted the exit of Nokia. 
 
5.1. Analogical reasoning, managerial beliefs, and investment decisions: 1998 to 2003  
Operating system. A new managerial belief informed by analogical reasoning at Nokia 
beginning in the late 1990s was that future success would originate from software applications. 
The 1999 Annual Report emphasized this as follows: 
Most of the new services, features and functions will be based on software—and much of it 
user-configurable. Software will play an increasingly important role in the coming years. 
That’s why we are taking a leading role in the development of software platforms […] for 
future mobile devices. 
 
The way we interact and communicate is entering a new era of exciting possibilities and 
opportunities. We are entering the era of the Mobile Information Society. An era of 
anything, anytime, anywhere. An era of unprecedented freedom. And the mobile phone is at 
the center of this revolution. […] We believe the mobile phone is the natural vehicle for 
putting the Internet into everybody’s pocket.  
 
In particular, analogical reasoning informed the strategic assumption that without 
differentiating the operating system, Nokia would ultimately not be able to differentiate its 3G 
handsets from the handsets of other manufacturers. This disruptive assumption was the result of 
the analogy with previous competition outcomes in the PC industry in which the Internet had 
already become a widespread reality in the late 1990s. Mobile Internet required forthcoming 3G-
handsets to run an operating system similar to that of PCs; this meant that Microsoft had the 
concrete possibility of entering the business and establishing its software platform for mobile 
handsets, just as it had done with Windows for PCs. In such a case, 3G handsets would likely 




us as follows: 
Our roadmaps indicate that we are going to face increased competition from software 
companies. We believe this is the case in particular of Microsoft, that has the opportunity 
to do in the mobile handset market what it did in the PC industry where, after the 
establishment of its Windows standard, hardware has become a commodity and Microsoft 
itself is taking most of the profits. That’s what we want to prevent as a mobile device 
manufacturer—we don’t want to go the way of the PC business. 
 
Another manager commented, 
The main issue with Microsoft’s Windows software is that it is a proprietary standard: PC 
makers do not have access to the source code. They cannot change the operating system 
and thereby they cannot provide different features, applications and user interfaces. That’s 
why we need to control the operating system running on our devices: we need to 
differentiate our devices from the ones of other manufacturers. Product differentiation 
creates value not only for handset makers but also for customers that can choose among a 
wide array of solutions. 
 
The 1998 Annual Report emphasized, 
Nokia will continue to introduce solutions and products based on non-proprietary 
standards and technologies in 1999 and beyond. 
 
The new managerial belief about the essential role of the operating system in product 
differentiation had a direct impact upon the investment decisions of Nokia’s managers. In the 
late 1990s, together with Ericsson, Motorola, and other leading manufacturers, Nokia’s managers 
established Symbian, a software licensing company whose mission was to develop the Symbian 
operating system (OS) for 3G mobile devices. The Symbian OS was an open platform that gave 
licensees access to the underlying software code so that they could modify the operating system 
itself and provide differentiated solutions on their own handsets, especially on-screen menus and 
graphics (user interfaces). However, software developers could easily port their applications on 
any Symbian-based device, regardless of the manufacturer. As a non-proprietary system, 
Symbian was thus 




consumers with a wide and varied selection of competitive, yet interoperable products and 
services (Nokia 2001Annual Report). 
In 2001, Nokia established its Mobile Software Unit and, in 2002, launched the Series 60 
Symbian-based user interface, which it licensed to other handset makers, such as Siemens, 
Samsung and Panasonic.  
The decisions to establish Symbian as an open platform and to license the Series 60 user 
interface were fully aligned with the lessons that Nokia’s managers had learnt from previous 
competition outcomes in the PC industry. As Niklas Savander, vice president of the Nokia 
Mobile Software Unit, explained,  
 the long-term goal of the company is to have 30% to 40% of a very large market [i.e., a 
market where Symbian was the dominant platform] rather than to have 50% to 60% of a 
smaller market.3 
Specifically, Nokia’s managers tried not to go the same way as Apple, who, after making its 
Mac OS operating system a proprietary standard, relegated its Macintosh computers to a small 
market niche. At the same time, by controlling the source code of Symbian, Nokia still 
guaranteed itself the opportunity to customize the software running on its devices and ultimately, 
to differentiate its devices.  
New product categories. Another managerial belief informed by analogical reasoning in the 
late 1990s was that digital technologies would generate completely new product categories and 
disrupt traditional (2G) voice- and text-based phones. The Nokia 2001 Annual Report illustrated 
this belief:  
                                                 
3 Pringle, D. 2001. Symbian gets a boost from Nokia in its software battle with Microsoft. Wall Street 





Technologies such as Java, XHTML, packet switching and multimedia messaging are 
becoming a tangible reality in the form of new product categories and concepts. Devices 
now coming on stream include imaging phones that also have cameras as well as phones 
that work as music players or game consoles. We believe these devices are contributing to 
the creation of entirely new communications markets. 
 
This new belief originated from the analogy between the impact of digital technologies on 
the mobile phone industry and the impact of these same technologies on the imaging, music, and 
game industries, where they had already disrupted the mainstream products and product features 
of such incumbent firms as Eastman Kodak. A senior manager commented as follows in the 
early 2000s:  
Internet, multimedia contents, music, imaging, games, and business applications like 
emails: by merging with mobile communication, each digital function represents the 
opportunity for a new product category. These disruptive technologies will drive the 
renewal of mobile phones as they did exactly with traditional cameras, music players, and 
game consoles. We are going to have cell phones which work as a sort of iPod, capable of 
downloading, saving and playing thousands of songs; cell phones which work as cameras; 
mobile phones for playing games against other phone users; and cell phones as Internet 
terminals.  
 
The new belief about the disruption of traditional voice- and text-centered phones led Nokia 
to deeply change its product models and features. The 2001 Annual Report illustrated,  
Our value-adding strategy for continued market leadership is the ongoing addition of new 
features and functionality to our phones. This means introducing new models within 
existing product categories while at the same time developing entirely new categories. 
 
In 2003, the company launched i) the Nokia 6600, a hybrid device that combined a phone 
with an advanced camera to enable users to take and immediately share high-quality pictures; ii) 
the Nokia N-Gage, a hybrid device that combined a mobile phone with a game console to enable 
users to play games against one another via Bluetooth or over the Internet; and iii) the Nokia 
3300, a hybrid device that combined a mobile phone with a fully integrated digital music player 




represented remarkable breakthroughs in product design: they were larger and heavier than 
traditional mobile phones and featured larger screens and innovative shapes that required users to 
hold them horizontally rather than vertically. In 2003, the company also announced the Nokia 
7700, a multimedia hybrid device optimized for web browsing and TV broadcasting.  
Overall, Nokia introduced a new product model/category (hereafter, the “hybrid model”) 
for each specific digital function. In the 2003 Nokia Capital Market Day, Vice President Anssi 
Vanjoki introduced the terms “game phones”, “music phones”, “imaging phones”, and “media 
phones” to label these “entirely new product categories”.4 The 2003 annual report illustrated 
their role in the whole product roadmap of the company:  
Nokia’s product matrix has six style dimensions (basic, expression, active, classic, fashion 
and premium) and five functional dimensions (voice, entertainment [i.e., music and 
games], media, imaging and business applications). By combining each of the styles with 
each of the functionalities, we should be increasingly able to address specific user needs. 
We believe for the different models to be successful, they need to be differentiated from one 
another by optimizing them for their primary usage [i.e., functional dimension]. 
 
 
5.2. Analogical reasoning, managerial beliefs, and investment decisions: 2004 to 2008 
Contrary to Nokia’s forecasts, mainstream customers rejected its disruptive hybrid models and 
favored instead rivals’ 3G products, which integrated different digital features such as color 
screens, a camera, and music. In the first half of 2004, Nokia consequently suffered a significant 
decline in sales and profits, with its market share decreasing to 29% from an average of 35% 
over the previous three years. Olii-Pekka Kallasvuo, head of the Nokia Mobile Phone division, 
admitted that “We definitely had gaps in our product portfolio”. CEO Jorma Ollila agreed that 
                                                 
4 Nokia Capital Market Day was an event held annually throughout the 2000s during which Nokia’s top 




the company had failed to anticipate the market evolution and product demand of traditional 
customers.5 
However, the response of Nokia’s managers was quick and bold. In 2004, they 
discontinued—only a few months after their release—the 3300 and 6600 hybrid models and 
cancelled the launch of the 7700 handset. Contextually, they switched the focus of their 
roadmaps to a completely new type of product category that combined, in the same device, all 
digital functions and Internet applications. In the 2004 annual report, Nokia’s managers used for 
the first time the word “smartphones” to introduce this new product category: 
a smartphone is a new category of mobile device that can run computer-like applications 
such as email, web browsing and enterprise software and can also have built-in music 
players, video recorders and other multimedia features. 
In 2005, they launched the brand-new Nseries family of smartphones. Anssi Vanjoki—the 
same top executive who in 2003 had directed the launch of Nokia’s hybrid models—described 
the Nseries as follows:  
The Nokia Nseries brings mobility to those experiences which used to be linked to a place 
or a single purpose device. This next step in digital convergence brings together mobile 
devices, Internet content, still and video cameras, music, email and much more. Nokia 
Nseries devices share similar design traits as mobile phones, but they are actually 
powerful pocketable computers with a comprehensive set of multimedia features.6 
 
The smartphones of the Nseries family clearly differed from the early hybrid models of the 
company. However, these smartphones similarly aimed to disrupt traditional voice- and text- 
based phones, and therefore, their development was still fully consistent with the belief regarding 
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the rise of new product categories, i.e., a belief originally informed by strategy making and 
analogical reasoning in the late 1990s. In 2004 and 2005, the Nokia Annual Reports continued to 
emphasize this belief as follows:  
The mobile device market is expanding from voice-based communications towards new, 
data-driven areas and applications in consumer multimedia and enterprise mobility 
solutions (Nokia 2004 Annual Report). 
 
The mobile communications market is dynamic, new vocabulary is emerging and 
definitions are changing. This is in line with the introduction of entirely new products and 
product categories (Nokia 2005 Annual Report). 
 
Between 2005 and 2008, Nokia launched more than 20 Nseries models. All of them were 
based on the Symbian operating system, which Nokia wholly controlled after it acquired the 
Symbian company in 2008. In the same years, Nokia released an updated edition of the 
Symbian-based Series 60 user interface, which was renamed the S60, and developed innovative 
software applications, such as maps, games, instant messaging, and an ad hoc interface (the “PC 
suite”), to connect smartphones to PCs. The company also launched the OVI online store, 
through which customers could access their favorite smartphone applications altogether.  
Thanks to these new investment decisions, Nokia established its leadership in the emerging 
smartphone market, with a share of almost 50% in 2007 and 2008. 
 
5.3. Analogical reasoning, managerial beliefs, and investment decisions: 2009 to 2016 
In the late 2000s, the growing popularity of smartphones and mobile Internet prompted the entry 
of two new major players, i.e., Apple, which introduced its iPhone and its iOS software operating 
system for mobile devices in 2007, and Google, which released its Android operating system in 
2008. Both challengers offered an alternative to Nokia’s Symbian. Whereas iOS was a 




available to any manufacturer. 
As they entered the smartphone market, Apple and Google brought with them the software 
skills and wide networks of application providers they had formerly developed in the PC 
industry. These networks allowed both companies to provide customers with a wide range of 
innovative applications (“apps”) that greatly enhanced their mobile Internet experience. By the 
end of 2010, Google offered more than 100,000 apps in its “Android Market”, and Apple offered 
more than 300,000 in its “App Store”; in contrast, only 20,000 apps were available for Symbian. 
The sales of Apple’s iPhones and Android-based smartphones (by manufacturers such as 
Samsung, HTC, and Motorola) literally boomed, to the detriment of Nokia. 
In response to the decline of Symbian, Nokia partnered with Intel in 2010 to create the new 
MeeGo operating system. However, since the development of MeeGo was proceeding slowly, in 
February 2011, Nokia dismissed both Symbian and MeeGo and embraced Microsoft’s Windows 
Phone as its new smartphone platform. The Nokia 2011 Annual Report illustrates the rationale 
for this partnership as follows:  
Certain smartphone platforms and their related ecosystems have gained significant 
momentum and market share, specifically Apple’s iOS platform and Google’s Android 
platform, and are continuing apace, with Android-based smartphones increasingly gaining 
market share at lower price points. In February 2011, we announced our partnership with 
Microsoft to bring together our respective complementary assets and expertise to build a 
new global mobile ecosystem for smartphones (the “Microsoft partnership”). Under the 
Microsoft partnership, formalized in April 2011, we are adopting, and are licensing from 
Microsoft, Windows Phone as our primary smartphone platform. 
By joining Microsoft, Nokia aimed to co-develop a new operating system that, similarly to 
Symbian, could allow the company to set its smartphones apart from those of other 
manufacturers, especially those that were using Android. The decision to embrace Windows 




the operating system in product differentiation—a belief  which strategy making and analogical 
reasoning originally informed in the late 1990s. The 2011Annual Report continued to emphasize 
this belief as follows: 
The market for smartphones has shifted from a device oriented strategy to a platform 
[software operating system] oriented strategy. Today, industry participants are creating 
competing ecosystems of mutually beneficial partnerships to combine hardware, software, 
services and an application environment to create high-quality differentiated smartphones.  
The first Nokia smartphones with Windows Phone were introduced in October 2011, under 
the new Lumia brand. However, after the launch of the Lumia family, Android-based 
manufacturers consistently increased their sales, with Samsung becoming the new market 
leader—together with Apple—and Nokia’s market share being relegated to a small niche that 
reached the peak of 3% in the 3rd quarter of 2013. Samsung, in particular, despite being unable to 
differentiate its operating system and applications from the operating system and applications of 
other Android-based manufacturers, succeeded over these manufacturers because of other 
sources of differentiation such as design, brand recognition, hardware performance (e.g., display 
resolution and shape), array of models and time to market.7 
On the one hand, Nokia’s Lumia models were also outstanding in terms of design and 
hardware features: for instance, the Lumia 1020, introduced in July 2013, featured a 41 MP 
(megapixel) camera, which was unrivaled at the time. On the other hand, the enduring lack of 
apps from software developers doomed customers’ interest in Windows Phone and ultimately in 
                                                 
7 Hirur, S. 2012. Samsung Emerges Clear Leader in Android Smartphone Market; International Business 
Times, May 19. Available at: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/samsung-rule-android-smartphone-galaxy-s3-sales-342946; 







the Lumia series: in 2013, Windows Phone featured 130,000 apps compared with the 1,100,000 
available for Apple’s iOS and the 1,000,000 apps running on Android.  
Because of the weakening of its financial position, in September 2013, Nokia sold its 
smartphone business to Microsoft. After the acquisition was finalized in April 2014, the sales of 
Lumia smartphones continued to stall, and Microsoft eventually decided to discontinue them in 
2016.  
 
6. A framework of analogical reasoning, cognition, and the response to 
technological change  
Fig. 1 summarizes our findings from the case study of Nokia regarding the evolution of 
analogical reasoning, beliefs, and investment decisions.  
“Insert Fig. 1 about here” 
 
 
On the one hand, between 2003 and 2008 the company managed to sustain its leadership and 
actually increased its profits and market share, especially in the emerging smartphone market. 
On the other hand, Nokia failed later on to cope with the entry of Apple and Google and 
eventually quit the smartphone market. Overall, our findings offer an emerging conceptual 
framework of the relationship among analogical reasoning, cognitive processes of attention and 
interpretation, and organizational performance in the face of technological change. 
 
6.1. Analogy and cognition 
As they faced the advent of digital technologies (in particular, digital imaging, game, and 




technologies) and the Internet, Nokia’s managers identified these discontinuities as the main 
drivers of future success or decline. Such identification was the premise for analogical reasoning: 
digital technologies and the Internet represented the relevant features (structural relations) that 
characterized the future leadership of the mobile phone industry (target problem). Nokia’s 
managers then thoroughly scanned the broad ICT business to retrieve other industries (source 
problem) that had previously shared the same structural relations: they eventually selected the 
imaging industry (which had already experienced the advent of digital imaging), the music 
industry (digital music), the game industry (digital gaming) and the PC industry (Internet). 
Nokia’s managers explored the success or decline of incumbent firms in these industries and 
drew deep similarities between the historical impact of digital technologies and the Internet on 
such incumbent firms and the future impact of the same technologies on mobile phone 
manufacturers.  
The insights from these analogies took the form of solutions (sources of success in the 
changing mobile phone industry) and warnings (barriers to success) that were encoded in the 
emerging beliefs of Nokia managers—beliefs that represented strong discontinuities from the 
history of Nokia and the entire mobile phone business under the previous 2G technological 
paradigm. Product and technology roadmaps contributed to the articulation and establishment of 
these discontinuous beliefs. This is the case for both the new belief regarding the emergence of 
disruptive product categories—as opposed to traditional text- and voice-based phones—and the 
new belief regarding the essential role of the operating system in product differentiation—as 
opposed to the historical sources of differentiation of mobile phones, such as product design or 
hardware features.  




insights gained from the game, imaging, and music industries. Nokia’s managers noticed that, in 
these industries (source problems), digital technologies (shared structural relations) had 
prompted the reduction of traditional products and services, the entry of new players, and 
ultimately, the decline of incumbent firms such as Eastman Kodak which were not quick enough 
to redesign their products, product features, and business models. These lessons were used to 
make inferences about the implications of digital technologies for mobile phone manufacturers 
(target problem) and were ultimately encoded in the new belief about the disruption of traditional 
handsets.     
The new belief that mobile phone makers would not be able to differentiate their devices 
without differentiating the operating system originated instead from the insights that Nokia’s 
managers gained from the PC industry. In the early 1990s, the incumbent firms of this industry 
(source problem) had already experienced the advent of Internet (shared structural relation) and 
suffered from a sharp decline in profit after the establishment of Microsoft’s Windows. This 
lesson was used for making inferences about the likely impact of the Internet on mobile phone 
manufacturers (target problem) and was ultimately encoded in the new belief about the essential 
role of the operating system in the differentiation vs. commoditization of mobile phones. To fully 
appreciate the cognitive discontinuity that was inherent in this new belief, it is worth 
emphasizing that when this belief originally emerged in the late 1990s, Nokia’s top executives 
had already been with the company for a long time; none of them had held an executive position 
at any PC firm. More importantly, all of the 2G mobile phones that Nokia had delivered until 
then featured a relatively simple user interface and did not use any operating system; the success 
of these 2G devices was based instead on the sources of differentiation of product design, time to 




Steinbeck, 2001).  
Given the influence of their prior history, Nokia’s managers likely believed that the 
successful differentiation of 3G handsets would come from the same competitive factors of 
product design, hardware features, etc. However, analogical reasoning led Nokia’s managers to 
focus their attention on the history of the PC industry rather than on their own mobile phone 
industry and on the role of the operating system in product differentiation rather than on the 
traditional drivers of success related to 2G handsets.  
Overall, our findings from the case of Nokia suggest that when managers face 
technological discontinuities, they are likely to scan their external environment and search for 
other industries that have already experienced the same technologies. Our findings also suggest 
that managers are likely to use these different industries as a source problem for analogical 
reasoning and that analogical reasoning is likely to help managers evolve their mental models, by 
enabling the rise of new beliefs that depart from the prior history of their company and industry.  
 
6.2. Analogy, cognitive attention and interpretation, overconfidence, and inertia   
The new beliefs informed by analogical reasoning beginning in the late 1990s, i.e., the beliefs 
regarding the prominent role of the operating system and the rise of new product categories, 
emerged as the new dominant logic that guided the key investment decisions of Nokia’s 
managers in their fast-paced business. These beliefs became deeply rooted, and despite negative 
market feedback on Nokia’s early products, they continued to direct the cognitive processes of 
attention and interpretation of Nokia’s managers for more than a decade, until the company 
finally quit the mobile phone market.  




introduce its hybrid models (i.e., Nokia N-Gage, 7700, 6600, and 3300) in 2003. When 
customers rejected these models, Nokia’s managers continued to firmly hold the same belief 
which continued to direct their investment decisions. In the mid-2000s, the company’s Annual 
Reports constantly emphasized that new product categories would emerge and disrupt traditional 
voice- and text-based phones (see the quotes in the previous section). Consistent with this 
strategic assumption, in 2005, Nokia was the first mobile phone manufacturer to launch a brand-
new family of smartphones, i.e., the Nseries.  
The belief about the essential role of the operating system in product differentiation had an 
even stronger and longer-lasting influence on strategic investment decisions. This belief initially 
led Nokia’s managers to invest in the development of the Symbian open platform in the late 
1990s. Afterwards, when the market share of Symbian started to drop in 2010, this belief 
survived the failure of Symbian itself and continued to direct the cognitive processes through 
which Nokia’s managers identified and evaluated the alternative options available for their next 
software platform. Nokia’s managers turned out to be overconfident in their belief about the 
essential role of the operating system in product differentiation and this overconfidence 
eventually increased organizational inertia.  
Specifically, when they dismissed Symbian and had to choose between Windows Phone 
and Android, Nokia’s managers still focused their attention on the potential to differentiate their 
software platform. Such a focus clearly emerges from what the top executives of the company 
had to say on the final decision to embrace Windows Phone. According to Nokia CEO Stephen 




ecosystem, but we felt we would have difficulty differentiating within that ecosystem”.8 Nokia’s 
managers were persuaded that they could not change Android sufficiently deeply to differentiate 
their devices from those of other companies using the same platform. By partnering with 
Microsoft instead, Nokia gave itself the opportunity to access the Windows Phone code and 
customize it. In the 2011 Annual Report, top executives emphasized the following: 
Although Microsoft will continue to license Windows Phone to other mobile 
manufacturers, the Microsoft partnership allows us to customize the Windows Phone 
platform with a view to differentiating Nokia smartphones from those of our competitors 
that also use the Windows Phone platform. 
 
Our future success in the smartphone market [depends on] our ability to introduce and 
bring to market quantities of attractive, competitively priced Nokia products with Windows 
Phone that are positively differentiated from our competitors’ products, both outside and 
within the Windows Phone ecosystem [emphasis added]. 
The belief about the essential role of the operating system in product differentiation also 
directed Nokia’s managers’ interpretation of the risks inherent in Windows Phone (vs. Android). 
When they signed the deal with Microsoft, Windows Phone was relegated to a mere 2% market 
niche. In the 2011 Annual Report, Nokia’s own executives emphasized the challenge “to make 
Nokia products with Windows Phone a competitive choice for consumers” and to thus create a 
“global ecosystem for Windows Phone smartphones that achieves sufficient scale, value and 
attractiveness to all market participants”. The manufacturing, marketing, and technological 
investments that Nokia was going to make in Windows Phone would clearly be irreversible and 
valueless if this platform failed.  
However, Nokia’s managers interpreted a partnership with Google as being even more 
                                                 





challenging and risky. Vice president Anssi Vanjoki compared handset makers using Android to 
Finnish boys “who pee in their pants” for warmth during the cold winter: these manufacturers 
were likely to enjoy only temporary relief because in the long run, they could not differentiate 
their products from rivals using the same operating system.9 Vanjoki emphasized that by 
embracing Android, Nokia   
would become a commoditised box-maker like Dell, scrapping for market share with rivals 
that all use Android and so seem more or less the same.10  
 
According to Nokia Chairman Jorma Ollila, the board of directors was unanimous when 
they chose Windows Phone over Android.11  
However, later on, the success of Samsung’s partnership with Android clearly showed that 
the PC industry and the mobile phone industry were not structurally aligned and the analogy 
between these industries was not effective. Specifically, the drivers of differentiation of mobile 
phones were more numerous and varied than those of PCs and included, beyond the operating 
system, product design, time to market, array of products, and hardware features. Nokia’s 
managers based the identification of their source problem for analogical reasoning on the new 
technology that would affect their mobile phone industry: the Internet was the overriding 
structural relation they took into consideration when the selected the source problem of the PC 
industry. By doing so, they overlooked the other and different drivers of competition (and 
thereby the other structural relations) that governed the different ways the mobile phone and the 
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PC industries worked.  
As a result, Nokia’s managers’ confidence in their assumption about the ultimate role of 
the operating system in product differentiation exceeded the real accuracy of this assumption 
(i.e., overconfidence) and this overconfidence led the company to bet its future on only one 
option (Windows Phone) rather than experimenting with both Windows Phone and Android—as 
Samsung did. (Beginning in the late 1990s, Samsung actually experimented with all of the 
alternative platforms that became available, i.e., Symbian and the Nokia’s Series 60 user 
interface, Microsoft’s Windows Phone, Google’s Android, and its own Bada. Even in 2013 and 
2014, despite Android’s clear market dominance, Samsung continued to develop some Windows 
Phone-based smartphone models.)  
In 2014, when Nokia’s managers realized that Windows Phone was not a valuable 
alternative to Android and that Samsung could differentiate its products even without a 
distinctive operating system, it was too late to shift to Android and emerge within this 
ecosystem. Nokia’s managers were left with no other choice than to sell the mobile phone 
business to Microsoft. Remarkably, Samsung based its success over other Android-based 
manufacturers on the different sources of differentiation—product design, array of products, 
hardware features, brand recognition, and time to market—that had been the main drivers of 
Nokia’s leadership within the previous 2G technological paradigm. Nokia’s managers’ 
overconfidence in their new assumption about the essential role of the operating system 
ultimately turned into a source of inertia that contributed to the decline of the company instead of 
to the sustainability of its competitive advantage.  
Fig. 2 summarizes our empirical evidence from Nokia regarding the relationship among the 





“Insert Fig. 2 about here” 
 
 
Overall, our findings suggest that when managers face a new technology and use other 
industries that have already experienced the same technology as a source problem for analogical 
reasoning, these managers are likely to develop new beliefs that become dominant and direct 
their strategic investment decisions. Our findings also suggest that when managers focus on the 
new technology as the main similarity (structural relation) between other industries and their 
own industry and overlook other drivers of competition, these managers are likely to become 
overconfident in their new beliefs and this overconfidence is likely to lead to organizational 
inertia.  
 
7. Discussion  
In this paper, we contribute to our understanding of analogy and cognitive dynamics in the face 
of technological discontinuities. Our core contribution is a conceptual framework that illustrates 
the effects of analogical reasoning on the cognitive processes of attention and interpretation. We 
respond to the question of how managerial beliefs originate and develop over time and how they 
influence strategic investment decisions (Kaplan and Tripsas 2008; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). 
More generally, we expand our understanding of the long-term performance of firms in turbulent 
environments (Teece, 2007).  
 
7.1. Analogy and managerial cognition 




Scholars have traditionally emphasized the role of the prior history of decision makers (including 
their idiosyncratic organizational experiences and industry affiliations) in informing their mental 
models (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986; Barr et al., 1992; Kaplan, 2008b). We expand this work by 
examining the role of analogical reasoning in informing managerial beliefs (Gary et al., 2012; 
Gavetti et al., 2005; Gilboa and Schmeidler, 2001; Loewenstein et al., 2003).  
By adopting a longitudinal perspective, we show that analogical reasoning at Nokia 
contributed to the renewal of the mental models that managers had developed through their 
idiosyncratic experiences at this company. Nokia’s managers explored the history of other 
companies and industries that had already faced the same technological discontinuities that they 
were going to face, and they drew strong similarities between such industries (source problem) 
and their industry (target problem). The novel beliefs that originated from analogical reasoning 
became deeply rooted and finally emerged as the new dominant logic that directed the key 
investment decisions at Nokia for more than a decade, namely, from the late 1990s to the mid-
2010s.  
In particular, our findings emphasize the cognitive discontinuity inherent in the new belief 
that the company could not differentiate its handsets without differentiating the operating system. 
This belief was derived from the previous history of the PC industry, as Nokia’s managers 
adapted the lesson from the rise of Windows and the decline of computer manufacturers to find a 
solution to how they could prevent the standardization of their next 3G devices. This new belief 
disrupted the “widely held orthodoxies” about the sources of differentiation that Nokia had 
traditionally exploited under the previous 2G technology and guided its investment decisions 
from the development of Symbian to the adoption of Windows Phone.  




not investigate its strategy making efforts, especially analogical reasoning, we cannot fully 
understand the origin of managers’ mental frames and their cognitive processes of attention and 
interpretation in the face of technological discontinuities. Future research efforts might build on 
our work to expand our understanding of the relationship between cognition and analogical 
reasoning in relation to the key questions of how managers search for analogies, evaluate their 
validity, and finally use them to address their target problem (Gavetti and Menon, 2016).  
 
7.2. Analogical reasoning, cognition, and performance  
By combining research concerning analogical reasoning and research concerning cognition, we 
add to our understanding of technology competition outcomes and, ultimately, adaptation and 
inertia in the face of technological change (Kaplan, 2008b; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). Our work 
underlines both the benefits and pitfalls that relate to the ability of analogical thinking to change 
the beliefs that managers inherit from their own history and the history of their own companies 
and industries.  
On the one hand, the renewal of mental models might help managers to escape the myopia 
and inertia that result from their past experiences (Kaplan, 2008a; Porac et al., 1995). At Nokia, 
this was the case of the belief that new product categories would disrupt traditional voice- and 
text-based phones. The analogy between the imaging, game, and music industries, on the one 
hand, and the mobile phone industry, on the other hand, was based on structural relations. In all 
these industries, digital technologies opened the door to completely different product features, 
services, and rival firms; to sustain their leadership (and avoid the mistake of some incumbent 
camera or game console manufacturers), incumbent mobile phone manufacturers had to pioneer 




analogy therefore was accurate, i.e., consistent with future competition outcomes. Despite 
rejecting Nokia’s early hybrid models in the early 2000s, mainstream customers started indeed to 
demand completely new devices with integrated digital features and Internet access: the belief 
about the rise of disruptive product categories contributed to the capability of Nokia’s managers 
to notice and make sense of this emerging demand more quickly and better than rivals. Nokia 
was the first company to launch a brand-new family of smartphones in 2005, i.e., the Nseries, 
through which it achieved a significant first mover advantage over rivals all throughout the 
second half of the 2000s (with an approximate share of 50% in the smartphone market).  
However, if analogical reasoning fails to anticipate the main future sources of competitive 
advantage, the new beliefs that derive from analogical reasoning itself are likely to become a 
source of inertia rather than adaptation. This was the case of the analogy between the PC 
industry and the mobile phone industry and of the belief that the software operating system 
would be the main driver of product differentiation. The reasons for the historical struggles of PC 
manufacturers applied only partially to mobile phone manufacturers. Although PCs became 
commodities after the establishment of a dominant software platform, smartphones could still be 
differentiated because of hardware features, product design, brand and time to market. The 
analogy between the PC industry and the mobile phone industry therefore was not based on 
structural relations and the resulting belief about the prominent role of the operating system was 
not accurate, i.e., consistent with future competition outcomes. In 2010, this belief led Nokia to 
embrace Windows Phone instead of Android, despite the opportunity to establish itself within the 
Android ecosystem (at that time, Nokia was still the leading global smartphone manufacturer).  
In this regard, previous scholars have emphasized that the resources (e.g., technological 




source of inertia (Liebermann and Montgomery, 1988; Mintzberg, 1990). Our findings build 
upon this work by expanding our knowledge about the ultimate reasons for organizational 
inertia. We show that firms can actually dismiss relatively easily the resources that they develop 
according to their early strategic plans and early entry in new markets. However, the same firms 
are less likely to dismiss the new managerial beliefs that arise from analogical thinking: these 
beliefs tend to become deeply rooted and have a long-lasting influence on cognitive attention and 
interpretation by continuing to direct the search process for the next organizational resources. 
The early beliefs that originate from analogical reasoning—not the early resources per se that 
managers develop according to their early entry in new markets—are therefore likely to become 
the most relevant source of inertia. 
The case of Nokia provides a compelling example. By rejecting Symbian, i.e., their early 
operating system, in February 2011, Nokia’s managers clearly demonstrated they were not 
locked into this operating system per se. Their reaction to market changes was actually prompt 
and bold: when Nokia’s managers dismissed it, Symbian was still the most popular operating 
system. On the other hand, by partnering with Microsoft, Nokia’s managers demonstrated that 
they were locked in the belief that was behind Symbian, i.e., the belief that the operating system 
was the key resource they had to control in order to eventually differentiate their handsets. This 
belief—rather than Symbian or Windows Phone per se—ultimately contributed to Nokia’s 
decline.  
 
7.3. Managerial implications  
By shedding light on the relationship among analogy, cognition, and long-term performance, our 




Nightingale, 2004; Porter et al., 2011).  
Our findings show that decision makers have a concrete opportunity to use analogical 
reasoning to evolve their beliefs in a changing environment. Analogical reasoning can thus 
effectively contribute to the cognitive skills that are the foundations of strategic foresight 
(Gavetti and Menon, 2016) and dynamic capabilities (Teece, 2007). However, decision makers 
have the key task of understanding when a new technology represents the main similarity 
(structural relation) between their industry (target problem) and another industry that has already 
experienced the same technology (source problem), by distinguishing such a case from those in 
which there are actually different drivers of competition – beyond the new technology – that 
govern these industries. Consistent with the findings of previous scholars (Gary et al., 2012; 
Gavetti et al., 2005), while decision makers who perform this task effectively are likely to make 
analogies that lead to accurate beliefs (as in the case of Nokia’s analogy between the imaging 
and the mobile phone industries and the belief about the rise of new product categories), 
managers who do not are likely to make analogies that lead to inaccurate beliefs instead (as in 
the case of the analogy between the PC industry and the mobile phone industry and the belief 
about the role of the operating system).  
In this regard, previous scholars have emphasized that effective approaches to strategy 
making should combine analytical efforts with continuous experimentation (Eisenhardt and Sull, 
2001; Grant, 2003). Our research builds on this work by strengthening the recommendation that 
managers experiment with different strategic plans instead of committing early to only one plan. 
Such experimentation could enable to make the distinction between structural and non-structural 





The opposite cases of Nokia and Samsung provide compelling evidence. Samsung 
experimented with different software platforms, whereas Nokia chose and committed very early 
to only one strategic plan. Consistent with previous findings from Camerer and Lovallo (1999) 
and Simon and Houghton (2003), Nokia’s managers were overconfident in their assumptions 
about the future, in particular, their assumptions about the prominent role of the operating system 
in product differentiation. First, Nokia’s managers committed to Symbian; later, they bet again 
the future of the company on only one option, i.e., Windows Phone. In contrast, by 
experimenting with alternative platforms and by embracing Android together with Windows 
Phone, Nokia’s managers could have increased the flexibility of not only their assets—i.e., their 
operating systems—but also, most important, their beliefs about future drivers of differentiation.  
 
7.4. Opportunities for future research 
Analogical reasoning at Nokia was supported by environmental scanning and product and 
technology roadmapping. Future research efforts might explore different approaches to 
analogical reasoning and technological forecasting (Hoisl et al., 2015; Porter et al., 2011). 
In particular, scholars and practitioners have emphasized the benefits of scenario planning 
in relation to organizational flexibility and learning (de Geus, 1988; Grant, 2003; Schoemaker, 
1993). Similarly, the research about real options has shown that they provide an effective 
framework for the generation and evaluation of alternative investment plans (Smit and 
Trigeorgis, 2004; Tong and Reuer, 2007). We suggest that future research efforts focus on 
scenarios and real options as valuable approaches to analogical reasoning that foster the 
flexibility of not only strategic investments but also managers’ mental models regarding the 





The aim of this paper is to gain a holistic, longitudinal understanding of the co-evolution of 
analogical reasoning, managerial beliefs, and competition outcomes in a turbulent environment. 
We studied the exemplar case of a firm that had to address major technological changes.  
Our research setting, data collection and data analysis were designed to enhance the 
construct and internal validity of our conceptual framework, whereas we sought to strengthen its 
reliability and external validity via data triangulation among different sources (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
However, it is critical to note that our work is based on only one focal firm. We selected our 
theoretical sample according to the main purpose of this paper, which is, as typical of case study 
research, to develop theory. Similar investigations of other companies and other industries are 
needed to provide further evidence for our conceptual framework. The next step is testing our 
emerging constructs (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
Scholars have already devoted considerable efforts into analyzing the reasons for the 
decline of Nokia. In his memoirs, former CEO Ollila (Ollila and Saukkomaa, 2013) emphasized 
the inability of the company to develop the software skills that it needed to cope with Apple. In 
addition, Vuori and Huy (2015) focused on the managers’ emotions and the fear resulting from 
Ollila’s aggressive behavior, and Laamanen et al. (2015) pointed to the company’s pitfalls in 
strategic execution. Our research complements this previous work by offering a new perspective 
on Nokia’s fortunes. We focus on a specific issue, i.e., the co-evolution of analogical reasoning 
and cognition in this company, that has remained largely neglected thus far.  
We hope that despite its limitations, our research might inspire the future efforts of 
scholars and help expand our theoretical and empirical knowledge of the relationship among 
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Fig. 2. Relationship among analogical reasoning, cognition, and technology competition 
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